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In the past decade, populist movements have vindicated another form of democracy that, from the 
perspective of constitutional law, is rooted in the claim of identity rather than representation. This 
has also resulted in a general rejection of the political and legal forms that are at the basis of the 
liberal constitutional form of government. However, the state as a system of rules that enables 
order – a nomos – has not been questioned and it still performs its function of emancipator and 
restrainer. Carl Schmitt seems to have best synthetized these two concepts by resorting, on the 
one hand, to the concept of identitarian democracy, a type of democracy based on the identity 
between rulers and ruled, and, on the other hand, to the Katékon, the form of political power that 
prevents the eruption of chaos. It is where these two elements meet that a bi-dimensional 
framework for political action, based on time and space, emerges.  
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This article aims to offer a constitutional law interpretation of the nature of populism 
and its counter-force, based on Carl Schmitt’s elaboration on the matter. The vague nature 
of populism, its characteristics, critical points, and limits, might be better understood 
through the prism of his works on democracy and the state. Interestingly, Carl Schmitt 
might be considered both as the herald of populism, for coining the concept of identitarian 
democracy, and as the framer of the state capable of resisting populism, as drawing upon 
the notion of Katékon. 
The first connection – Schmitt as a forerunner of populism – is, of course, rather 
obvious. Schmitt’s conception of democracy, based on the identity rule between rulers 
and ruled, is well known, and stems from one of his most famous works1. This identitarian 
conception of democracy has been held as a viable alternative democratic paradigm to 
that of liberal, pluralistic, constitutional, and parliamentary democracy2. Its influence was 
felt far beyond the academic world3. 
Together with other Schmittian legal categories – the state of exception, the friend/foe 
distinction, the geo-political space and the existential legal order –, be they inventions or 
re-elaborations, the concept of identitarian democracy has been acclaimed for his 
profundity but has nevertheless not been well received; particularly it has been held to be 
the evil twin of democracy itself4. Then, it comes as no surprise that, with the rise of 
populist movements in the 2010’s, Schmitt’s works saw a substantial revival and he is 
now considered one of the sinister fathers – be it the most sophisticated one – of this 
political trend5.  
The second connection – Schmitt’s elaboration on the Katékon, the force which 
prevents the fragmentation of the order – is, by contrast, much more controversial. The 
notion of the Katékon is pretty obscure, because of both the content of the notion itself, 
which is grounded in theology, and the author’s interpretation, which is rather evanescent. 
Moreover, Schmitt addressed this legal concept in less known and more fragmented texts, 
and it has been generally labeled as shorthand for an amalgam of his anti-modernism and 
anti-positivism.  
However, I do believe that this evasive concept could be utilized in order to gain a 
better understanding of the Schmittian concept of the legal order, and to find a better 
contextualization of the relationship between democracy and the state. 
                                                 
1 C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (E. Kennedy ed. transl.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
2000. 
2 C. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G. Schwab ed. transl.), The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005; Political Romanticism (G. Oakes ed. transl.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
1986; Theory of Partisan (G. Ulmen ed. transl.), Telos Press, New York, 2007. 
3 As Muller puts it «thought on Schmitt was safely contained within the universities. Yet Schmittian thought 
was not». See J-W. Muller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought, Yale 
University Press, Yale, 2013, p. 206. 
4 K. Kovacs, Parliamentary Democracy by Default: Applying the European Convention on Human Rights 
to Presidential Elections and Referendums, in Ius Cogens, No. 2, 2020. 
5 D. Kelly, Carl Schmitt’s Political Theory of Dictatorship, in J. Meierhenrich, O. Simons (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; L. Vinx, The Incoherence of 
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The resulting framework forms part of the oscillation that Schmitt experienced 
between the radical impulses of identitarian democracy and the conservative structure of 
the Katékon in a restless movement in search of a synthesis6. The complexity of Schmitt’s 
legal thought then appears as a viable tool for analyzing the current wave of populism in 
politics and, at the same time, the resilience of the notion of the state as emancipator and 
restrainer of powers7.  
 
2. Clarifying the concept: The Populism 
 
It must first be established what exactly constitutes the concept of populism. The 
literature, political and legal, on this topic has become overwhelming in just one decade8. 
My tentative definition relates to a constitutional law understanding of the term and to its 
connection with democracy and the state, both of which are at the core of this article.  
The notion was first used to describe the trend of late XIX century Russian intellectuals 
who were seeking a connection with the people and attempted better to understand their 
way of living9. The notion of populism had a nationalistic tone from its inception, since 
in Russia this movement had a clear pan-Slavic ethnic and religious connotation, as 
opposed to the socio-political trend that saw in approaching the Western world the 
ultimate destiny of the country10. Populism was therefore an intellectual and cultural 
movement. It was led by élites, who, different from other élites11, were looking – or 
thought they were looking – at the real people. Those who were detached from artificial 
constructs such legislative assemblies and opinion circles, living with their authentic 
needs and customs. In the populists’ view, such organic mass of human experience should 
have inspired the external and internal political action of the Russian Empire. 
Modern populism, despite the different circumstances and the development over the 
past century of human institutions such as democracy, still has the same structure and 
                                                 
6 G. Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt, Verso Books, London, 2000, p. 
221. 
7 C. Schmitt, Sound State and Strong Economy (R. Cristi ed. transl.), in R. Cristi, Carl Schmitt and 
Authoritarian Liberalism, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1998. 
8 Among the many: S. Hardt, A.W. Heringa, T. Nguyen, Populism and Democracy, Eleven International 
Publishing, De Haag, 2020; G. L. Neuman, Human Rights in a Time of Populism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2020; F. Bignami (ed.), EU Law in Populist Times: Crises and Prospects, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2019; M. Revelli, The New Populism, Verso Books, New York, 2019; E. 
Roger, G. Matthew (eds.), National Populism: The Revolt against Liberal Democracy, Pelican, London, 
2018; C. Mudde, C. R. Kaltwesser (eds.), Populism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2017; J-W. Müller, What is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2016; C. 
De La Torre, The Promise and Perils of Populism: A Global Perspective, University of Kentucky Press, 
Lexington, 2015; D. Albertazzi, D. McDonnell (eds.), Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of 
Western European Democracy, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; F. Panizza, Populism and the Mirror 
of Democracy, Verso Books, New York, 2005; P. Taggart, Populism. Concepts in the Social Sciences, Open 
University Press, London, 2000. 
9 The original American populism emerged in the same years and, similarly, was centered around the 
discontent of American farmers in the West and in the South vis-à-vis the ‘plutocrats’ and ‘aristocrats’ in 
Washington and who looked for another type of government which might overcome the pitfalls of 
representative democracy, see N. Pollack, The Populist Mind, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1967, p. 337. 
10 L. Canfora, Gramsci in carcere e il fascismo, Salerno Editore, Roma, 2012. 
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objectives: culturally, to live organically with the people when they work, live and express 
themselves, taking distances from cultural élites. 
For this reason, populism might be described as a moralized approach to politics that 
praises a homogeneous group of people against a corrupt elite and minorities that cannot 
be part of such an undifferentiated collectivity12. From a legal-political perspective, 
populism has the aim of removing politicians and other intermediaries – élites again – 
who stand between the people and power, and of relying only on the will of the people in 
order to decide what course of action the state should take. The cultural perspective 
clearly has significant implications for the legal-political one, and the other way around. 
It is not negligible, for instance, that populism rejects the inclusive, but elitist, political 
language known as ‘political correctness’. By rejecting this specific political language, as 
opposed to the common one, populism appears as the political form that aims to bridge 
together rulers and ruled under the paradigm of identity. This seems to be the very core 
of the populist claim: that rulers and ruled are the same, that any distinction between them 
in terms of status (class, power, wealth, but also language, education, background) and 
actions (language again, but also values, lifestyle, feelings, behaviors) must be rejected13. 
Not surprisingly, this is the same claim, at large, of democracy14. 
Populism, in fact, emanated from the promise of democracy itself: mainly, that is the 
people who should rule. Even in the most restrained and limited conceptions of 
democracy, and in their concrete applications, it is the people’s will who rules, or should 
rule, no matter how it might look15. But while democracy implies a relation between the 
rulers and the ruled in terms of identity, populism goes even further by interpreting this 
(necessary) identity in terms of immediate presence.  
Generally, in a democracy, only conditioned powers are allowed to exist: the sovereign 
– that it is inevitably the people in a democratic regime – must always remain absent from 
the sphere of politics16. 
Since sovereign power is not immanent to the political community but rather 
transcends it, it must be represented. According to populists, however, the people are a 
present, living constituent power, the only one that possesses sovereignty. Following this 
                                                 
12 The hereby research on populism is theoretical and not empirical – and non-evaluative too –, and therefore 
it does not investigate whether the populist movement or regimes actually pursue the goals they believe in 
or claim to believe in. Regarding the opportunistic and power-grapping approach of populism see G. 
Halmai, Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism, in German Law Journal, Vol. 20 No. 3, 2019, 
p. 296; K.L. Scheppele, The Opportunism of Populist and the Defense of Constitutional Liberalism, in 
German Law Journal, Vol. 20 No. 3, 2019, p. 314. 
13 It is not a random choice that exactly in populist movements is popular the ideal of binding instructions 
to the parliament by the electors (as well as other tools such as prohibition of more than two legislatures 
for parliament members, direct consultation with the people for taking political decisions, decrease of 
parliamentary salary, prohibition of party public financing and so on): they are all consequences of the 
paradigm of identity between rulers and ruled. 
14 L. Corrias, Populism in a Constitutional Key: Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional 
Identity, in European Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 12 No. 1, 2016, p. 6. 
15 According to Bobbio populism arises from the broken promises of democracy: that the people truly never 
rule. See N. Bobbio, Saggi sulla scienza politica in Italia, Laterza, Bari, 1969. 
16 E.W. Böckenförde, The Constituent Power of the People. A Liminal Concept of Constitutional Law, in 
M. Kunkler (ed.), Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Constitutional and Political Theory. Selected Writings, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; A.J. Jacobson, B. Schlink (eds.), Weimar. A Jurisprudence of 
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populist line of thought, then, political institutions that mediate, dilute and fragment this 
conception of sovereignty should be removed. In fact, in the populist understanding, there 
are no institutions; there are only the people17.  
Populism then institutionalizes the undetermined character of the people: not the 
people in general are sovereign, but the current people, who exist here and now. It is an 
immanentization of the ideal of popular sovereignty: the sovereign – the people – is 
contingent and immediate. This cult of immediacy conveys the omnipresence of the ruler 
whose power cannot be mediated by parliamentary deliberations, political agreements or 
media communications, which, as mediators, all breach the identity between rulers and 
ruled and therefore do not fit in the populist equation of the sovereign-the people18.  
This explains why so many populists are inimical to, or at least skeptical of, human 
rights. Human rights prevent political groups from arrogating sovereignty by ensuring 
that the sovereign cannot be identified with any particular interest advocated in society: 
they embody the distinction between transcendence and immanence of political power. 
The human rights mediation determines a political community where the individual does 
not have to directly confront the generality, whereas for populists, the identity between 
the rulers and the ruled demands the full concentration of the generality vis-à-vis an 
individual19. For populists, minorities are not welcome either, since they do not fit the 
identity paradigm. In their view, they can still exist but they are not entitled to any 
particular legal entitlement or protection. Consequently, populist regimes have a tendency 
to repudiate norms of tolerance and openness, and attack institutional checks and balances 
that protect such minorities20. 
                                                 
17 R. Howse, Epilogue: In Defense of Disruptive Democracy. A Critique of Anti-populism, in International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 17 No. 2, 2019, p. 653. 
18 There has been a significant proliferation of academic definitions of the populist claim to represent the 
people and then the only legitimate public power: Constitutionalism Capture (J.W. Muller); Constitutional 
Regression (T. Ginsburg); Constitutional Populism (G. Halmai); Constitutional Riot (J. Balkin); Abusive 
Constitutionalism (D. Landau); Authoritarian Constitutionalism (M. Tushnet); Stealth Authoritarianism 
(O. Varol); Autocratic Legalism (K.L. Scheppele); Democratic Backsliding (N. Bermeo); Democracy 
Decay (T. Daly). Despite their differences in names and contents, all these reflections point out that populist 
movements have a tendency to occupy the space above the law (the constitutional level) by presenting the 
people as a permanent constituent power; that their political action is mostly exercised in an authoritarian 
style, with little respect for legal and institutional rules; that their understanding of democracy is anti-
pluralist and anti-liberal, in a world, identitarian. 
19 M. Canovan, Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy, in Y. Meny, Y. 
Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Palgrave, London, 2002, p. 25; P. Taggert, Populism 
and the Pathology of Representative Politics, in Y. Meny, Y. Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist 
Challenge, cit., p. 62; M. Canovan, Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, in 
Political Studies, Vol. 47 No. 1, 1999, p. 2; N. Urbinati, Democracy and Populism, in Constellations, Vol. 
5 No. 1, 1998, p. 110. 
20 In the wake of World War II liberal constitutionalism emerged as a default architectural choice for 
political systems across Europe and North America, and then spread out around the world. This type of 
government setting generally provides for a written constitution that enumerates individual rights, the 
existence of a rights-based judicial review, a high threshold for constitutional amendments, a commitment 
to periodic democratic elections, a system of checks and balances and fidelity to the rule of law. In a word 
dominated by limited-liberal democracy by a structural purview and constitutionalism-liberalism by a 
content purview, populism represents an illiberal democratic response to an undemocratic liberal 
framework. Populism is always anti-liberalism, as a moralized form of anti-liberalism: it rejects liberalism 
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Populism, generally, does not demand the suppression of the whole system of 
separation of powers, but rather calls for their rebalancing: if legislation is deliberare and 
the executive is agere21, they generally favor the executive over the legislative branch of 
government, the latter of which they blame for its complex procedure but not for the 
function it expresses22. The branch of government that populists are most critical of is the 
judiciary. This is because of its adjudicative function, which may obstruct the legislative 
and executive branches in their functioning (then addressing both constitutional and 
ordinary courts). Another reason is the judiciary non-democratic nature, which does not 
fit with the sovereign-people equation23. 
 
3. Populism and Schmitt’s Identitarian Democracy 
 
In this article, I argue that there are clear links between populism, as briefly described 
above, and Schmitt’s notion of democracy. Even though he was not the strongest 
proponent of democracy, Schmitt did believe that after the First World War, democracy 
was the only legitimate source of power for a political entity. According to him, “the 
dominant concept of legitimacy is in fact democratic”24.  
For Schmitt, democracy has to be understood as an attempt to establish an identity 
between the rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed, and the state and the 
people in the search of homogeneity in and of the community25. In his full acceptance of 
the democratic regime, he believed such an identitarian regime was more consistent and 
integral to the concept of democracy than the liberal-constitutional state that restricted the 
democratic power by enacting anti-majoritarian institutions.  
In fact, Schmitt noted that two different forms of power might establish and maintain 
a state: representation and identity. To him, representation was a discursive, inter-
subjective, fundamentally elective and artificial form of power. Against it, he expressed 
his preference for the identity form, which he considered more genuine; and where the 
full identity between the rulers and the ruled – such as in Ancient Athens – was not 
possible, the identification of the ruled with the rulers would have still been an acceptable 
form. This was connected to Schmitt’s idea of a monolithic and not pluralistic democracy, 
with its people at its basis, idealized in one substantial each other’s oneness called 
homogeneity. Since he imagined the people to be homogeneous and considered 
democratic power to be the only legitimate source of power, there could not be any 
representation, dilution or delegation of power, but only the pure expression of that power 
through acclamation and referenda. In particular, the people «can only engage in acts of 
acclamation, vote, say yes or no to questions» as posed to them from above26. As such, 
the people «cannot counsel, deliberate, or discuss»27.  
                                                 
21 S. Issacharoff, The Corruption of Popular Sovereignty, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
Vol 18 No. 4, 2020, p. 1109. 
22 J.W. Muller, The People must be Extracted from within The People, in Constellations, Vol. 21 No. 4, 
2014, p. 483. 
23 C. Mudde, C.R. Kaltwesser (eds.), Populism: a Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2017, p. 116. 
24 C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, cit., p. 21. 
25 Idem, p. 24. 
26 C. Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (J. Seitzer ed. transl.), Duke University Press, Durham, 2008, p. 34. 
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Schmitt’s conception of democracy is therefore against the ideal of a deliberative 
parliament, where public opinion would be able to crystalize and guide state action. In 
fact, he questioned the whole ideal of a rational public opinion that should agree to the 
best or most truthful arguments rather than to power, will or interest-based demands. 
Schmitt rejected this: he argued, «the essence of political life is to be understood as a pure 
decision not based on reason and discussion […] an absolute decision created out of 
nothingness»28. 
Therefore, tools for creating, debating, and circulating ideas are, in Schmitt’s view, 
not essential, nor are the corollary rights of freedom of opinion, speech, press and 
manifestation. Such freedoms are not so important as they are in a representative 
democracy: the whole system of freedom of speech, assembly, the press, the public 
meeting, parliamentary immunities, and privileges presupposed a deliberative vision of 
parliamentary practice29. Most of these rights were protected on the basis of their 
contribution to parliamentary debate that is not relevant in the Schmittian identitarian 
democracy. Because the people are homogeneous, there is no need for a melting pot of 
different opinions; since there are no delegated powers, there is no need for a free press 
which checks and controls abuses; there is no point for representation, because there is 
only will. Individuals do not need to form their own ideas because the people’s own ideas 
are internal: paraphrasing St. Augustine, in interiore populi habitat veritas.  
This political form may as well imply the necessity of marginalization of minorities 
that fall outside the identity paradigm on which democracy rests. In contrast to 
representative democracy, identitarian democracy embraces intense, life-threatening 
crises where minorities are expelled from the collective body of the people by making the 
people even truer to themselves and keeping their homogeneity intact30. 
 
4. On Government of Men and Angels 
 
Populism nowadays finds in Schmitt’s identitarian democracy a viable model: both 
populism and identitarian democracy aim at substituting the relationship of trust between 
rulers and ruled, which characterizes representative democracy, with the one of identity. 
In particular, they equally contrast the concept and implications of accountability that is 
at the basis of representative democracy. The emphasis on accountability values that is 
inherent to representative democracy emanates, more intimately, from the pessimistic 
conception of human nature. 
Accordingly, men, especially politicians, are not angels and so they must be bound as 
much as possible31. It is on this pessimistic conception of human nature that the modern 
tradition of representative democracy was built on32. 
                                                 
28 C. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, cit., p. 28. 
29 B. Scheuerman, Is Parliamentarism in Crisis? A Response to Carl Schmitt, in Theory and Society, Vol. 
24 No. 1, 1995; W.E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism, in The Review of 
Politics, Vol. 58 No. 2, 1996. 
30 C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, cit., p. 9. 
31 L. Miotto, From Angels to Humans: Law, Coercion, and the Society of Angels Thought Experiment, in 
Law and Philosophy, 2020, p. 2. 
32 M. Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
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Accordingly, the existence of democracy and public power is nothing more than the 
second best – or the least worst – option in government of men. As stated by Madison33, 
if men were angels, no government would be necessary (and therefore no democracy 
would be needed). Considering the human nature, however, a government must exist, 
because men are evil, and incapable of doing well by themselves. The least bad option is 
therefore to have a (democratic) government, whose powers have been constrained and 
slowed-down, and that is least intrusive as possible in human affairs. This because, 
following Madison, the government itself is the greatest of all reflections on and of human 
nature, and therefore, is evil per se34. If we had to govern angels, neither external nor 
internal controls on government would be necessary. But because of men, there must be 
a government, and such a government must be bound, limited and representative. 
Bound, in order to prevent the rulers to do excessive harm to the ruled by abusing the 
powers given to the former by the latter; limited, because it is still preferable to have the 
harm done by men in their individual capacity rather than through the means of 
government, or at least, this will reduce the harm done to property owners; and 
representative, because the better and wealthier men would be the most apt to use public 
power and resist its temptations. Populism might accept this pessimistic understanding of 
human nature, and even the necessity though not desirability of government, but it comes 
to different conclusions: because men are bad, especially politicians, it is better to extract 
them from the people, who instead are inherently good, every time it is not possible to 
have the people directly ruling themselves. The most natural and immediate way to make 
sure that rulers do not betray or neglect the ruled, populists argue, is the bring them under 
the paradigm of identity. The concept of identity imposes a form of accountability on 
politicians in terms of deprivation of a specific political language, a margin of political 
appreciation and any long-term strategy that could not be immediately appreciated and 
approved by the people. 
 
5. Approaching the Katékon 
 
As established thus far, Schmitt seems to be the most relevant constitutional law 
scholar in the field of populism; no other scholar has expressed so clearly, in terms of 
identitarian democracy, the aspirations and the structure of populism, and its anchorage 
to democracy itself. 
However, Schmitt is also the legal thinker of a structured and complex state, based on 
legal rules, even if mostly of existentialistic type, that seems at odds with the populist 
idea35. Moreover, Schmitt never adhered to a Soviet-style nihilistic conception of the law, 
nor to a volkisch palingenesis of the law in name of the people pure will36. Certainly, 
                                                 
33 A. Hamilton, J. Madison, J. Jay, The Federalist Papers (C. Rossiter, C. R. Kesler eds.), Signet Classics, 
New York, 2003, p. 322. 
34 Schmitt linked atheism and skepticism to the government “For [Dostoyevsky’s] basically anarchistic (and 
thereby, also, atheistic) instincts, every political power was something wicked and inhuman”, C. Schmitt, 
Romischer Katholizismus und Politische Form, Klett-Cotta, Köln, 1925, p. 54. 
35 Muller describes Schmitt’s constitutional theory as «a brilliant conservative effort in deconstructing and 
containing mass democracy». See J-W. Muller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European 
Thought, cit., p. 31. 
36 R. Sharlet, Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture, in R.C. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism: Essays In Historical 
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Schmitt was never wholly detached from the German tradition of thinking about the legal 
nature of the state37. For him, the state was inextricably linked to the law: it is an 
institution created and constituted by rules, which are the way to explicate sovereignty at 
its basis38. The Schmittian state, therefore, is mostly a nomos. 
What role has the state in the Schmittian identitarian democracy framework? It seems 
that the state has both emancipatory and restraining functions: liberating the energies of 
democracy by taking political-existential decisions, but also restraining its inherently 
disruptive force. As such, the Schmittian state is created through a decision, temporally 
contingent, and does not allow any other conflicting decision during its lifetime: there 
shall be no other state as long as there is such a state. 
The state is therefore made of a continuous and internal democratic struggle: resorting 
to another Schmittian concept, it lives in a permanent state of exception. This perpetual 
tension, which Schmitt accepts as an inherent element of politics, especially in 
democracies, makes the state live in a peculiar condition: it cannot ever rest in peace. By 
never being at peace, the state prevents the bellum omnium contra omnes39 by ensuring a 
form of political order wherein everyone gives back his original (unlimited) power on the 
world to the state, sublimating the inter-subjective conflicts into a higher, political 
dimension40. 
Because individuals living in it have to mediate with it, compromise with it and deal 
with it, the state takes up the role of the great mediator, where the continual democratic 
struggle takes place within its framework and boundaries. The state is therefore the 
creator and guardian of the mundane peace41. The political form of the state dilutes then 
the natural violence of democracy throughout the principle of representation of political 
instances, diverging from the populist principle of mere identity42. 
To understand the nature of such a state and its function in Schmitt’s thought, as well 
as its relationship with the ideal of identitarian democracy, it may be useful to refer to the 
theological concept of Katékon43, the temporal power that withholds the appearance of 
the Antichrist44. Schmitt has referred to and re-interpreted this concept from a 
constitutional law perspective, in line with the classic authors45, describing the Katékon 
                                                 
37 R. Howse, Europe and the New World Order, in Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 19 No. 1, 
2006. 
38 N. Bhuta, The Mystery of the State. State Concept, State Theory and State Making in Schmitt and 
Oakeshott; M. Loughlin, Nomos; L. Vinx, Carl Schmitt’s Defence of Sovereignty, in D. Dyzenhaus, T. 
Poole (eds.), Law, Liberty and State: Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015.  
39 N. Bobbio, Democracy and the International System, in D. Archibugi, D. Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan 
Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order, Polity, Cambridge, 1995, p. 17. 
40 Schmitt believes then that Hobbes wrote Leviathan as a form of political action in an attempt to counteract 
the anarchy brought about by the religious fanaticism and sectarianism that destroyed the Commonwealth 
during the Puritan Revolution. 
41 C. Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political 
Symbol (G. Schwab, E. Hilfstein eds. transl.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008. 
42 C. Schmitt, The Leviathan in Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes (G. Schwab ed. transl.), Greenwood 
Press, Westport, 1996. 
43 M. Cacciari, Il Potere che frena, Milano, Adelphi, 2013; M. Maraviglia, La penultima guerra. Il 
Katékhon nella dottrina dell’ordine politico di Carl Schmitt, Edizioni Universitarie, Napoli, 2006; M. 
Nicoletti, Trascendenza e Potere. La teologia politica di Carl Schmitt, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1990. 
44 2 Ts 2, 1-12 (2,7 
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as the political form that prevents the dissolution of the existing order. For him, the 
lawlessness and the absence of order represented the realm of the Antichrist: by contrast, 
a legal order was a concrete historical force that upheld the maintenance of truth through 
the tireless efforts of mankind. 
The first appearance of the concept of Katékon dates back to two lesser-known works 
Land und Meer and Beschleuniger wider Willen46. Both were written twenty years later 
the works on identity and democracy, in a very different context, where Schmitt’s concern 
was no longer how to exploit the energies of the will of the people vis-à-vis the constraints 
imposed by alien forces – such as the Treaty of Versailles – but rather how to frame a 
restraint against the disruptive forces that wanted to annihilate and eradicate the past in 
the name of a new world order, such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Later, in 
Nomos of the Earth Schmitt comes back to the Katékon, giving it a full account within 
his political theology, as a historical concept that preserves the monolith of Christianity 
and holds back the end of history47. 
For him, the Katékon is indeed a given concrete political power acting in the world, 
which arrests the explosion of chaos and, as such, is a necessary element of Christian 
theology48. Interestingly, Schmitt describes the Katékon not only as a restraining and 
preventing force, but also transformative power that safeguards what it destroys, enacting 
a new form of what was once old, like the German-Roman Empire and the Catholic 
Church did in the Middle Ages with regard to the former Roman and Pagan traditions. 
The Katékon, therefore, beyond refraining and preventing, means also preserving and re-
comprehending.  
The Schmittian Katékon is therefore very similar to the Hobbesian Leviathan: it is a 
god, but mortal49. It means that it strives for perpetuity but is not eternal. The Katékon 
occupies a certain space and time, exercising a containing force that prevents and 
restraints any internal element that trespasses its boundaries, being delirious and 
compromising its political form. It might expand and enlarge its boundaries, as a result 
of political struggle and of decisions taken within, but it does need boundaries. 
Thus, the Schmittian state might be described as a Katékon to the identity claims that 
populism fosters. The concept of a Katékon is at odds with the principle of identity 
between rulers and ruled, since there cannot be any restraint when the restrainer is 
identical to the restrained. 
However, the Katékon is by no means merely a keeper of the order. By preventing and 
refraining the chaos, the Katékon owns it, so that the chaos shall not fully manifest itself: 
                                                 
which is now at hand, and is likely to flame out in the conclusion of this century, and to be such a horrid 
scene of misery, is retarded by this interposition of the Roman prosperity; and therefore we desire not to be 
spectators of dissolving nature; and while we pray for it to be deferred, we pray for the subsistence of the 
Roman Empire”. 
46 C. Schmitt, Beschleuniger wider Willen oder: Problematik der westlichen Hemisphäre, in Das Reich, 19 
April 1942, now in C. Schmitt, Staat, Großraum, Nomos. Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1916-1969 (G. Maschke 
ed.), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1995; however, Schmitt himself vindicated that the first elaboration of 
the theory of Katékon dates back to a letter of him to Pierre Linn in 1932. C. Schmitt, Glossarium (P. Dal 
Santo ed. transl.), Giuffrè, Milano, 2001. 
47 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (G.L. 
Ulmen ed. transl.), Telos Press, New York, 2003, pp. 13; 40.  
48 Idem, p. 49. 
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the Katékon is the prison of the chaos. The Katékon is then inhabited by impulses and 
disorders of the civil war. However, since it permits to such a disorder to live within, by 
giving a limited time and space to the chaos emersion, it actually prevents its apocalyptic 
manifestation. Therefore, the Katékon contrasts the chaos, but in doing so it must endorse 
part of its nature too50. Thus, by refraining populism, the state-Katékon also contains and 
comprehends it – popular sovereignty is an essential part of the state authority. As the 
mortal god that contains and equalizes all individuals, it represents them by containing 
them.  
In what way, then, the state-Katékon is different from the liberal state? Could it be that 
Schmitt, after thirty years of complex legal and political thinking, simply revisited his 
original anti-parliamentarian ideas and concluded that, in the end, a representative-liberal 
state was the only viable option for political entities? No, not every state – and, surely, 
not the liberal state – is a Katékon. In order to qualify as a Katékon, the state has to be an 
empire (a Reich): a political entity capable of exercising a significant force in both the 
crucial dimensions of time (Epoch, as a temporal arch for human interactions) and space 
(Raum, as a territorial basis for its political orientation). For being a Katékon, such a state 
has to move further its boundaries, to have a growing authority in order to not lose its 
imperial authority (autorictas derives from augere, to expand and increment). Its imperial 
authority is therefore connected to its proactive energy: it has to increment its energy 
because its essence is production and conservation altogether51. 
Therefore, the state-Katékon must have potestas and autorictas. Without the latter, its 
power would be exclusively an executive power, as it was in the XIX century liberal state: 
a Staat and not a Reich, and therefore not a Katékon. The task of the state-Katékon is to 
hold back the advance of universalism, to delay the realization of world unity, which for 
Schmitt is the negation of the political action, and therefore of the human condition. 
Without a teleological horizon, the state and its public power would be lost, meaningless, 
errant, in a word, delirious. 
For Schmitt the only remedy to such a meaningless, non-political world (the realm of 
the Antichrist) is the recognition of, and unequivocal obedience to, the Katékon: and that 





6. On the Teleological Horizon of the Katékon 
 
Despite its crucial role in history, the Katékon, in the form of the state or another 
political form, does not have any divine authority. According to Schmitt, the nomos of 
the Katékon is not the eternal Truth, whose not even an iota should fall down. 
The Katékon cannot claim any true authority in the theological sense: it may regere 
(to reign) but cannot imperare (to lead) towards a final goal. Its power is ultimately 
temporal. Accordingly, the Katékon is a mortal and temporary political form, and one 
should be able to name the Katékon for every circumstance. Schmitt believed in the 
                                                 
50 M. Cacciari, Dell’Inizio, Adelphi, Milano, 1990, p. 624. 
51 R. Cavallo, Il Katéchon nella teologia politica di Carl Schmitt: forza che frena o forza che trasforma?, 
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uninterrupted succession of historical Katékon: it is possible, then, that the Katékon in the 
past was not the state and will not be the state in the future either, but will instead take an 
entirely different form52. 
A political form, however, might vest the role of Katékon insofar as its potestas is 
sustained by autorictas, meaning that the Katékon can perform its function only if it has 
a credible, teleological horizon. In the Nomos of the Earth53 Schmitt points out that the 
Katékon teleological horizon prevents and restrains, on this earth, the eruption of chaos 
and disorder, in order to protect something of value. This might have been, in the past, 
the Catholic Church or the German-Roman Empire, which have ensured the continuity 
between the ancient world and the Middle Ages, so that the legacy of the Classic and 
Christian world would not be lost in the advent of new times. 
Sometimes even minor institutions or characters can fulfill the role of the Katékon, 
like the Habsburg Emperors Franz Joseph, who prevented, through his efforts and long 
life, the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, a bulwark of the XIX century 
European order, or Rudolph II who, because of his flamboyant and accommodating 
character, managed to delay the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, and so the division of 
Germany54. In any case, the Katékon – better, each Katékon55 for each crucial time and 
space56 – has always the aim of preventing the eruption of chaos. 
However, exactly because of Schmitt’s adherence to Christian theology, the Katékon 
too has to fall in the end and let the disorder emerge. Schmitt equates then the realm of 
the Antichrist on earth to a hubristic period of peace in which all meaningful difference 
is eliminated57. The Christian conception of history does not accept the myth of the eternal 
and cyclical return: it is rather teleological. From a Christian theological perspective of 
human history, once the disorder has emerged, for a given time the Katékon will contain 
it. The Antichrist will therefore prevail on the Katékon, which will brutally dismissed, but 
in the end, Christ will return and conclude human history. 
Therefore, ultimately the fall of the Katékon is not only inevitable but also necessary 
for the achievement of human salvation. By preventing the advent of disorder, the 
Katékon also prevents the Eschaton, the end of all the things and the coming of the Truth. 
That is why, once its restraining function has been performed, the Katékon has to 
                                                 
52 Schmitt admitted that Europe, as a political entity, could have been in the future a Katékon against the 
dominion of the technique imposed by the United States and the Soviet Union. C. Schmitt, The Nomos of 
the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, cit., p. 317. 
53 C. Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, cit., p. 44. 
54 C. Schmitt, The Grossraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign 
Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law, in Writings on War (M. Nunan ed. 
transl.), Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 75. 
55 Interesting examples noted by Schmitt are the Byzantine Empire, which prevented the Islam to conquer 
Southern Europe for almost thousand years; Marshal Pilsudski, which retarded the umpteenth division of 
Poland during his rule; and President Masaryk, who anchored the Czechoslovakia to Western Europe after 
the First World War. See M. Ojakangas, A Philosophy of Concrete Life: Carl Schmitt and the Political 
Thought of Late Modernity, Peter Lang, Bern, 2006, p. 35. 
56 A Katékon might then have a different size and role according to the time and space that it intervenes it, 
from centuries to few years, from enormous continental space to single territory. C. Schmitt, Glossarium, 
cit., p. 91. 
57 J. Meierhenrich, O. Simons, H. Oliver, A Fanatic of Order in an Epoch of Confusing Turmoil: The 
Political, Legal, and Cultural Thought of Carl Schmitt, in J. Meierhenrich, O. Simons (eds.), The Oxford 
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disappear, to be dismissed58. Interestingly, the Eschaton begins with the triumph of the 
forces of disorder and culminates with the appearance of the Antichrist59, whose 
treacherous capacity is exactly to manifest himself as Christ without actually being Him. 
The Antichrist is indeed a (false) substitute for Christ, but not His opposite: he is a living 
false truth60. Thus, returning to our Schmittian interpretation of populism and Katékon, 
the self-decision of populism that makes immanent what should be transcendent, namely 
sovereignty, it is false truth of self-assertion. 
Here populism actually acts like the Antichrist: a living sovereign, a perpetual 
constituent power, which aims to manifest itself as the truth. Populism therefore wants to 
exist as a pure form of political power without any mediation, representation, or 
boundaries, as they have been all settled by the state-Katékon, which instead tries to 
retard, infinitely but unsuccessfully, the moment when the current immanent people 




The concluding remarks open the door to another question, namely if the state, as we 
have understood it for the last two centuries, still has a teleological horizon, if it still is a 
plausible Katékon vis-à-vis the forces of different natures, which aims to get rid of the 
current legal order. 
The answer to this question goes beyond the scope of this contribution. This article 
had the more limited ambition of casting a light on the character of the political trend 
labeled ‘populism’ and of assessing the resistance and durability of the limits – in the 
sense of boundaries – to such a political attitude, which have been found in the Schmittian 
concept of Katékon. 
Nowadays, what appears relevant in the Katékon concept, more than who embodies it, 
is the function it expresses in political-legal terms: by retarding the end of all the things, 
it enables a time – to be intended as the temporal endurance of a certain set of shared 
understanding of human interactions – and a space – intended as a large space with 
sufficient cultural hegemony where a political idea might irradiate and unify – that is 
eminently political, allowing men to decide on their existential basic conditions of living 
together: Katékon and identitarian democracy then, might go together61. 
                                                 
58 2 Ts 2, 1-12 (2,8). 
59 The enemy to which 2 Ts 2 refers and, whom the Messiah will eliminate, is not called the evil but rather 
than a-nomos. W. Horbury, Antichrist among Jews and Gentiles, in M. Goodman (ed.), Jews in a Graeco-
Roman World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 117. 
60 What were for Schmitt the forces of chaos? The neutral and de-politicizing notions of liberalism, 
Marxism, globalization, and pacifism: they actually appeared to him as demoniac entities, self-proclaiming 
values good once for all, which do not know distinction or differentiation, and enacting a World State with 
‘power over each race, people, language and nation’ (Ap 13,7). Such forces seem to be – in the Schmittian 
thought – the Antichrist, whose function is the world pacification and whose structure is a-nomic, deprived 
of a nomos which it is always partition of the earth. Schmitt was clearly concerned for ‘the end of history’ 
in the aftermath of World War II. See C. Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus, Greven Verlag, Köln, 1950, p. 90. 
Still, e believed that the course of history was not yet ended. See E. De Vries (ed.), Alexandre Kojéve - Carl 
Schmitt Correspondence, in Interpretations, Vol. 29 No. 1, 2001, p. 91. 
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Schmitt’s famous assertion that «the concept of the state presupposes the concept of 
political»62 also works the other way round: the political exists in the framework of the 
state; but while the political is a permanent condition of human life, the state is only a 
temporary framework for politics, just like the Katékon. The fact that in the same author, 
it is possible to find both the most classic claim of populism and the most lucid 
interpretation of the function of the state proves once more the richness and complexity 
of Carl Schmitt’s legacy. 
                                                 
62 C. Schmitt, The Concept of Political (G. Schwab ed. transl.), Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1996, 
p. 19. 
